Designed for Failure: A Critique of the Common Fisheries Policy of the European Union

• Abstract

  The Common Fisheries Policy (CFP) is the European Community’s instrument for the management of fisheries, aiming to enhance the sustainability of fish stocks and the economic competitiveness of the fishing industry. However, neither the living aquatic resources, nor the profits of the fishing industry have benefited from it, with 88% of the stocks being overfished and profit margins of fishers continuously declining (Green Paper April 2009, European CommissionEC 2009). An ideal fisheries policy should foster the sustainable use of fish stocks, provide for coherent laws and regulations that yield adequate economic incentives, and guarantee consistent enforcement of the legal framework. Furthermore, the regulation scheme ought to be based on transparent rules rather than a discretionary political decision making process, which may be blurred by short-term interests. None of these principles are met by the CFP. In this article we explore the biological, economical, legal and political shortcomings that have led to its failure. We then evaluate how these shortcomings are addressed in the recent Green Paper (EC 2009) which aims at promoting the reform of the Common Fisheries Policy after 2013.

• Keywords

  sustainable fisheries, EU policy

• Download

  Designed for Failure